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In MoVey v. hVittingto, 1 a personal injury suit, the plaintiff
had testified on cross-examination that no one in the car in
which she was riding had been drinking and that she did not
smell alcohol on the breath of anyone in the car. The defendant
sought to ask a patrolman whether he had smelled alcohol on
the breath of the driver of the car in which the plaintiff had
been riding. Objection to this question was upheld on the ground
of irrelevancy. On appeal the defendant contended that the
question should have been allowed as bearing on the credibility
of the plaintiff. The supreme court, in line with the general
rule, held that a party cannot be impeached on a collateral issue
and therefore the question was properly ruled inadmissible.
2
Roohester v. North Greenville Junior (ollegeO was an action
arising out of an automobile collision. An allegation as to the
existence, near the scene of the accident, of a double highway
sign reading "School Bus Crossing" and "35 M.P.H." was
ordered struck as irrelevant. This ruling by the trial court was
held to be error. The school bus crossing sign did not limit the
applicability of the speed limit to the time of day when school
buses were operating nor was it solely for the protection of those
riding on school buses. Thus the speed limit at the scene of the
accident was relevant to the issue of negligence.
The defendant argued that the testimony of the plaintiff's
witness, a patrolman, to the effect that the speed limit at the
scene was fifty-five miles per hour was binding on the plaintiff
and precluded him from complaining of the exclusion of evi-
dence relating to the sign. The court noted that the evidence of
the sign had been previously excluded and therefore the patrol-
man's testimony was no more binding on the plaintiff than testi-
mony which is contrary to the law would be binding on the court,
the speed limit being fixed by statute, not by the patrolman's
testimony.
Toole v. Sater4 was a personal injury and property damage
suit arising out of a collision between a moving and a parked
1. 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E.2d 92 (1966).
2. See Smith v. Smith, 194 S.C. 247, 9 S.E2d 584 (1940) ; State v. Brock,
130 S.C. 252, 126 S.E. 28 (1925); State v. Milam, 88 S.C. 127, 70 S.E. 447
(1911).
3. 249 S.C. 123, 153 S.E.2d 121 (1967).
4. 154 S.E.2d 434 (S.C. 1967).
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automobile. The trial court refused to take judicial notice of
the time of sunset on the day of the collision, holding that such
time was irrelevant. The supreme court reversed, holding that
the time of sunset is relevant to the question of whether the
accident took place during the time when parking lights are
required by statute to be displayed.5 The court further held that
the trial court should have taken judicial notice of the time of
sunset.6
In Reid v. S'wind7er,7 a wrongful death action, the plaintiff's
intestate was struck by an automobile while crossing the street
in front of the school in which she was a student. The question
arose as to whether rules issued by the school concerning safe
crossing of the street were admissible as evidence of contributory
negligence on the part of the deceased. The court, relying on
cases in other states, held that such rules, not having been given
compulsory effect by the legislative body, are not admissible in
civil actions as evidence of negligence due to their violation.8
In State 'v. Thomas9 the defendant appealed his conviction for
rape, complaining that evidence of other crimes committed before
and after the alleged rape should not have been admitted over
his objection. The court admitted the existence of the general
rule precluding the admission of evidence of other crimes but
noted several common exceptions to the rule. Evidence of other
crimes has generally been admitted to show (1) motive, (2)
intent, (3) the lack of mistake or accident, (4) a common plan
in which proof of one crime tends to prove commission of the
others, and (5) the identity of the defendant.10 Evidence of
Thomas' prior conviction for the theft of the present prosecu-
trix' watch was admissible to show that she was able to identify
Thomas during the later crime and also to show motive. Evi-
dence of crimes of violence and physical abuse toward the prose-
cutrix after the alleged rape was admissible to show a scheme
5. S.C. CoDE AN. § 46-539 (1962) requires parking lights to be displayed,
under specified conditions, "during the hours between a half hour after sunset
and a half hour before sunrise ......
6. Accord, Fields v. Jackson, 102 Ga. App. 117, 115 S.E.2d 877 (1960);
29 Am. JuR. 2d Evidence § 98 (1967) ; 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 100 (1964).
7. 154 S.E2d 910 (S.C. 1967).
8. Accord, Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963) ;
Long v. Tomlin, 22 Tenn. App. 607, 125 S.W.2d 171 (1938).
9. 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966).
10. See State v. Bullock, 235 S.C. 356, 111 S.E.2d 657 (1959); State v.
Brooks, 235 S.C. 344, 111 S.E2d 686 (1959); State v. Gregory, 191 S.C. 212,
4 S.E.2d 1 (1939) ; State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923) ; State v.
Weldon, 39 S.C. 318, 17 S.E. 688 (1893).
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or continuous transaction and went to prove lack of consent and
to explain why no immediate outcry was made by the victim.
II. HEARSAY
In Lee v. Gulf Inmurance Company" the plaintiff sought to
recover a judgment previously obtained against an insured of
the defendant company. The defense was based, inter alia, on
non-coverage under the terms of the policy. The defendant's
proffered evidence, both written and oral, of statements made
by the insured was excluded as hearsay. The court accepted as
settled law that the plaintiff possessed the rights of the insured
and was subject to defenses existing against the insured in favor
of the insurer.12  The court refused to accept, however, the
defendant's view that hearsay which would be admissible, under
an exception, against the insured if he were the plaintiff, is also
admissible against the injured party as the plaintiff here.13
The rationale of allowing the introduction of an admission of
a party adversary, that he is in no position to object on the basis
of lack of confrontation or of opportunity to cross-examine, is
not applicable in this instance. The court noted that the allow-
ance of such proffered testimony would encourage prevarication
and put a premium on false swearing in affidavits.
III. WAIVER oF OBjcTioN TO ADMImssmIIIT
,State v. Murray14 reaffirmed the well settled rule that pre-
judicial evidence in a non-capital case, if not objected to at trial,
may not be the ground for an appeal as the objection is consid-
ered waived.15
In Gentry v. Watkins-Carolina Trucking Company16 a wit-
ness for the plaintiff was allowed, over the defendant's objection,
to testify from notes made from company records which the
witness maintained. The court found it unnecessary to pass on
the best evidence question as the defendant cross-examined the
witness on the subject without reservation of his objection,
11. 248 S.C. 296, 149 S.E2d 639 (1966).
12. Crook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 S.C. 257, 98 S.E2d 427
(1957).
13. Accord, Columbia Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 101 F2d 151 (5th Cir. 1939).
14. 248 S.C. 473, 150 S.E2d 920 (1966).
15. McCreight v. MacDougall, 248 S.C. 222, 149 S.E.2d 621 (1966) ; State v.
Cokley, 83 S.C. 197, 65 S.E. 174 (1909).
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thereby waiving his objection. The defendant also assigned as
error a ruling by the trial judge excluding statements made by
the plaintiff and the defendant to a patrolman at the scene of
the accident, contending that the statements should have been
admitted as part of the res gestae. The court held that since the
defendant had requested the exclusion of the testimony at the
trial he could not now complain of the ruing.U
In State v. Jenkins,ls as in Gentry, the defendant lost his
objection by failure to reserve it prior to cross-examination on
the subject. The court, however, by way of dictum, discussed the
merits of the defendant's objection. The court concluded that
when reckless homicide is charged, heedlessness or willfulness
being an essential element thereof, evidence of the manner and
speed of driving as early as fifteen minutes before the accident is
admissible as bearing on the state of mind of the defendant. 19
IV. OPI No EVDENCE
In Easterlin v. Green2  an expert testified that one with the
percentage of alcohol in his blood that was found in a sample of
the defendant's blood would be "drunk." The court held in this
wrongful death action that this opinion was not conclusive on
the jury so as to support a directed verdict, the term "drunk"
being a relative one subject to interpretation.
In Gentry v. Watkins-Carolina Trucking Company,21 the per-
sonal injury and property damage suit mentioned above, the
plaintiff called a doctor who testified concerning the medical
history given him by the plaintiff. The defendant contended
that the doctor was consulted solely for the purpose of qualify-
ing him as a witness and that therefore he could not testify as
to the patient's statements. While the court found no evidence
in the record to support this contention, it went on to say that
even if the contention were correct the patient's statements were
admissible, not as substantive proof of the truth of the patient's
statements, but as information relied on by the doctor in arriving
17. See Wright v. Gilbert, 227 S.C. 334, 88 S.E2d 72 (1955); Smith v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 S.C. 310, 4 S.E2d 270 (1939) ; Nock v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co., 175 S.C. 188, 178 S.E. 839 (1935); Snipes v. Augusta-Aiken
Ry. & Elec. Corp., 151 S.C. 391, 149 S.E. 111 (1929).
18. 155 S.E2d 624 (S.C. 1967).
19. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 13, 14 (1956).
20. 248 S.C. 389, 130 S.E2d 473 (1966).
21. 154 S.E2d 112 (S.C. 1967).
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at his diagnosis and prognosis. In this dictum the court indi-
cated it thought this majority view to be the sounder one.22
The parties are entitled to an instruction to the jury on the
limitation of such doctor's testimony, but here the defendant did
not request an instruction.
V. H oTsMroM A QUsSTIoNs
In Chapman v. Foremost Dairis, Inc.28 the court held that an
objection to a hypothetical question asked an expert witness
must be specific enough to give counsel an opportunity to re-
phrase the question to meet any meritorious objection.24 Thus
the general objection that a hypothetical question is an improper
one, containing matters not supported by the record and omitting
matters of importance, was properly overruled in a workmen's
compensation hearing.
C. Pincx= ROBERTS
22. See generally C. McCoRmcx, EViDENcE §§ 266-67 (1954); Annot., 130
A.L.R. 977 (1941); Amnot., 80 AL.RL 1527 (1932); Annot, 67 A.L.1R 10
(1930).
23. 154 S.E2d 845 (S.C. 1967).
24. See 88 C.J.S. Trial § 129b (1955) ; cf. Greer v. Greenville County, 245
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